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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2019, I first heard Bennett Capers describe an early draft
of Against Prosecutors. We were at a national conference of criminal law
professors, and Capers was presenting to a crowded room. The draft that would
turn into Capers’s 2020 Cornell Law Review article posed a novel question:
given prosecutors’ role in driving mass incarceration, would we be better off
with a system of private, victim-led prosecution?1 Capers answered yes. Public
prosecutors don’t serve the interests of victims, he argued, and empowering
victims might have the counterintuitive effect of creating a more lenient system.
The packed house for the presentation was no surprise—Capers’s work is always
a big draw, and the title was eye-catching, to say the least. What was a bit
surprising to me was the reaction. Capers succeeded in doing something that I
thought impossible: he unified the audience, bringing together former
prosecutors and former public defenders, liberals and conservatives, reformers
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38CZ3260G
Copyright © 2022 Benjamin Levin
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. First and foremost, many thanks
to Bennett Capers for writing a characteristically thought-provoking article and for welcoming these
responses. Thanks to Carolyn Ramsey and Bennett (again) for helping to organize this Symposium and
to Amina Fahmy, Will Ward, and the California Law Review Online editors for their assistance and for
giving these essays a home. Thanks, as well, to the other Symposium participants: Jeff Bellin, Angela J.
Davis, Roger Fairfax, Jenia Iontcheva Turner, and Corey Rayburn Yung. Thanks, as always, to Jenny
Braun for comments, conversations, and criticisms.
1. See I. Bennett Capers, Against Prosecutors, 105 C ORNELL L. R EV. 1561, 1563–65 (2020).
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and abolitionists. As audience member after audience member commented, the
refrain became apparent: Capers couldn’t possibly be right.
That shared reaction helped me appreciate what makes Against Prosecutors
such a valuable contribution—it hits a nerve, challenging unquestioned
assumptions about how the world works. As I’ll explain in this Essay, I disagree
with Capers. But—like all Capers’s work—Against Prosecutors pushes us to
think differently and to question features of the criminal system that we might
have taken for granted.2 The unified opposition showed me that Capers had
identified an area of unexamined consensus.
In this Essay, I argue that private prosecution won’t solve what I see as the
fundamental problems with the U.S. criminal system. I worry that the victimdriven prosecution that Capers envisions risks re-entrenching punitive impulses
and legitimating institutions of punishment. And, rather than solving the
problems of a society that sees punishment and justice as synonymous,
privatization risks exacerbating many of the existing pathologies of U.S. political
economy. The turn to a “private” model of “criminal justice” resembles other
neoliberal governance projects, where core state functions are outsourced and
where social problems are addressed at the individual level, rather than
structurally.3
To be clear, my critiques of private prosecution aren’t meant to suggest that
public prosecution is a good, or perhaps even a better alternative. Indeed, I’ve
argued elsewhere that the promise of so-called “progressive prosecutors” as an
antidote to mass incarceration is largely illusory.4 But, I take Against Prosecutors
as an invitation to ask whether a private, victim-driven approach to prosecution
would be a step in the right direction.5 And, I conclude that it wouldn’t be.
My response proceeds in two Parts. In Part I, I offer four critiques of
Capers’s proposal: (A) that shifting power to victims still involves shifting power
to the carceral state and away from defendants; (B) that defining the class of
victims will pose numerous problems; C) that privatizing prosecution reinforces
a troubling impulse to treat social problems at the individual level; and (D)
broadly, that these critiques suggest that Capers has traded the pathologies of
“public” law for the pathologies of “private” law. In Part II, I step back from the
implementation of Capers’s proposal to argue that the article reflects a new, left-

2. See id. at 1608 (arguing that “we should always ‘ask the other question’” that might not be
immediately apparent (quoting Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out
of Coalition, 43 S TAN. L. R EV. 1183, 1189 (1991)).
3. Cf. Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in
Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 A M . C RIM . L. R EV. 111, 112 (2001) (describing this dynamic in the
context of private prisons).
4. See Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, 105 MINN. L. R EV. 1415,
1450 (2021).
5. I don’t read Capers as suggesting that victim-driven prosecution is the answer to the violence
and injustice of mass incarceration. Rather, I read Against Prosecutors as offering private prosecution
as one method of beginning to address the inequities of the criminal apparatus.
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leaning vision of victims’ rights. I see Against Prosecutors as illustrating an
impulse among many progressive and left commentators to prioritize victims’
interests and to suggest that decarceration and victims’ rights actually could go
hand-in-hand. Ultimately, I argue that this (re)turn to victims’ rights has some
promise but should be cause for concern for abolitionists, criminal law
minimalists, or others skeptical about institutions of criminal punishment.6
I.
THE LIMITS OF VICTIM-DRIVEN PROSECUTION
In this Part, I raise four concerns about privatizing prosecution. As a
preliminary matter, Capers is careful to note that he isn’t focused on questions
of “implementation” in his article.7 And, I appreciate that move to focus on
bigger picture questions. My goal, therefore, isn’t to suggest that the failure to
trace out the exact contours of prosecution in action dooms the project. Instead,
I see these questions of application as reflecting fundamental problems with any
system of private prosecution.
A. Power Shifting, Uncertainty, and State Violence
In recent work, Jocelyn Simonson has argued that the study of criminal law
would benefit from a greater engagement with questions of political power.8
Specifically, Simonson has argued for an approach to criminal scholarship and
policymaking that prioritizes “power-shifting”—the goal should be providing
voice and power to marginalized communities.9 Capers’s argument strikes me as
an example of this move. He claims that the system as it exists has failed to
advance the interests of marginalized victims.10 As Capers contends, “[a]t the
same time that prosecutors have amassed power, actual victims have lost
power.”11 By empowering victims to direct the prosecution of their own cases,
Capers argues, the legal system would effectuate the sort of power shift that
Simonson envisions.12
I am sympathetic to this goal, and I find prioritizing the redistribution of
power to be admirable. At the same time, I remain skeptical at best that any
system of prosecution could produce such a seismic shift in social and political
6. Cf. Máximo Langer, Penal Abolitionism and Criminal Law Minimalism: Here and There,
Now and Then, 134 H ARV. L. R EV. F. 42 (2020) (distinguishing between abolitionism and
minimalism).
7. Capers, supra note 1, at 1608.
8. See generally Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform through a Power Lens, 130 Y ALE L. J.
778 (2021).
9. See id. at 787; see also Monica C. Bell, Katherine Beckett & Forrest Stuart, Investing in
Alternatives: Three Logics of Criminal System Replacement, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. R EV. 1291, 1326
(2021) (“[J]ust governance requires careful attention to (though not uncritical deference to) knowledge
from ‘below,’ or expertise that emanates from lived experience.”).
10. See Capers, supra note 1, at 1571.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 1583–1608.
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power.13 No matter how it is conceived or designed, private prosecution would
still rely on a host of state institutions for enforcement. If a victim chose to seek
punishment, it would be the state, not the victim, who would do that punishing.
Any private power to bring charges or seek punishment would operate against
the backdrop of brutal, state-run jails and prisons. If a victim chose other forms
of non-carceral state intervention (as Capers hopes would be the case in many
situations),14 power would still rest in the hands of the state actors or statesanctioned institutions that would do that intervening. And, as recent critical
work has shown, such models of diversion or alternatives to punishment often
are much less benign than they sound.15 That is, private prosecution might shift
some power from prosecutors to victims. But, as Capers rightly notes,
prosecutors aren’t the only actors who hold power in the criminal system.16 Other
actors (police, judges, probation officers, wardens, and so forth) would continue
to hold power in a world of private prosecution.17 And, it’s not clear that victims
necessarily would hold more power than these other actors.
Even to the extent that Capers’s proposal would shift some power to
marginalized victims, it would still maintain inequalities and retain structures of
marginalization or subordination. The power wielded by marginalized victims
would have a target—it would be defendants. The shift to victim-driven
prosecution would not undo structures of inequality for the simple reason that
defendants, as Capers rightly notes, tend to come from the same race-class
subordinated groups as victims.18 Even putting demographics aside, a system of
state-sanctioned punishment that punishes or excludes a class of people (i.e., the
defendants) wouldn’t become more egalitarian or anti-authoritarian by changing

13. See Benjamin Levin, Wage Theft Criminalization, 54 U.C. D AVIS L. R EV. 1429, 1494
(2021) (“[T]he turn to criminal law is shifting more power not just to the state, but to its punitive
arm. . . .”).
14. See Capers, supra note 1, at 1598–1603.
15. See, e.g., E RIN H ATTON, C OERCED: WORK U NDER T HREAT OF P UNISHMENT (2020);
MAYA S CHENWAR & V ICTORIA L AW, P RISON BY A NY O THER NAME: T HE H ARMFUL
C ONSEQUENCES OF P OPULAR R EFORMS (2020); Erin R. Collins, The Problem of Problem-Solving
Courts, 54 U.C. D AVIS L. R EV. 1573, 1628 (2021); Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53
A M . C RIM . L. R EV. 595, 597 (2016); Aya Gruber, Amy J. Cohen & Kate Mogulescu, Penal Welfare
and the New Human Trafficking Intervention Courts, 68 F LA. L. R EV. 1333, 1333 (2016); Allegra M.
McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J.
1587, 1591 (2012); Noah D. Zatz, Better Than Jail: Social Policy in the Shadow of Racialized Mass
Incarceration, 1 J.L. & P OL. E CON. 212, 214–15 (2021).
16. See Capers, supra note 1, at 1570–71; see also Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94
N.Y.U. L. R EV. 171, 187–203 (2019) (arguing that prosecutorial power is constrained by power held
and exercised by police, legislators, and judges); Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power
Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. R EV. 835, 856–57 (2018) (same).
17. Cf. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 Y ALE
L.J. 2054, 2087 (2017) (“[I]ncreasing the power of the state bears at most a spurious relationship to the
outcome of concern, which is social inclusion across groups.”).
18. See Capers, supra note 1, at 1600.
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the class of people who hold the reins of power.19 Rather than eliminating power
imbalances, private prosecution would shift the site of power.20 As I’ll discuss
in Part II, that persistent imbalance might not bother some proponents of power
shifting. But this move to private prosecution would retain a system in which
some people (here, defendants) are treated as deserving objects of punishment,
subordination, or control.21
B. Defining the Class of “Victims”
Capers justifies a potential turn to private prosecution on distributive
terms—it would lead to more power in the hands of victims from marginalized
communities.22 That’s one possible outcome, but one reason for my skepticism
is the indeterminacy of victimhood as a legal concept.23 Who is a victim?
Answering this question is essential to Capers’s argument and any theory of
private prosecution. If the state is going to cede tremendous power to victims,
then defining that class takes on the utmost significance. Further, if private
prosecution is justified on distributive terms,24 it becomes even more important
to understand whom the state would recognize as a victim.

19. See Benjamin Levin, Criminal Justice Expertise, 90 F ORDHAM L. R EV. 2777, 2828
(2022); cf. Bernard E. Harcourt, Matrioshka Dolls, in T RACEY L. MEARES & D AN K AHAN, U RGENT
T IMES : P OLICING AND R IGHTS IN INNER -C ITY C OMMUNITIES 81, 87 (Joshua Cohen & Joel
Rogers eds., 1999) (suggesting that shifting control of policing to a marginalized community won’t
necessarily lead to equality because of “the risk that the majority (now of the minority community) won’t
bear the burdens of its laws but instead will infringe upon the liberty of a powerless or despised minority
within it”).
20. Cf. Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM . & M ARY L. R EV. 1, 5
(2010) (“[T]he distributive aspects of criminal law are quite visible, as discourse regarding closure and
‘making victims whole’ normatively endorses that criminal law should ensure a fair outcome by
distributing pain to offenders and thereby satisfaction to victims.”).
21. See Levin, Criminal Justice Expertise, supra note 19, at 2828.
22. See Capers, supra note 1, at 1571, 1583–1608.
23. See Jamelia Morgan, Responding to Abolition Anxieties: A Roadmap for Legal Analysis,
120 MICH. L. R EV. 1199, 1222 n.112 (2022) (describing “the constructed nature of both crime and
victimhood that is central to abolitionist analysis); cf. MARKUS D IRK D UBBER , V ICTIMS IN THE
WAR ON C RIME: T HE U SE AND A BUSE OF V ICTIMS ’ R IGHTS 3 (2002) (discussing the relationship
between victims, “victimless crimes,” and the state).
24. By “distributive terms” I mean that the identity of the victims and defendants matter such
that the policy is a success if it distributes right—i.e., if the right sorts of victims are empowered or the
right sorts of defendants are punished. This move—a “distributive” or “distributional” analysis—is a
feature of certain critical approaches to law. See, e.g., Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Rachel
Rebouché & Hila Shamir, Preface to G OVERNANCE F EMINISM : N OTES F ROM THE F IELD, at xvii
(2019); Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical Criminal Law
Theorizing, 83 F ORDHAM L. R EV. 3211, 3213 (2015); Levin, Wage Theft Criminalization, supra note
13, at 1476–77. As Capers explains, this is a project of asking: “Who benefits from the status quo of
allowing public prosecutors to decide what cases to pursue? Who benefits when the predominance of
public prosecutors enables the state to create a swath of victimless crimes and claim itself as the victim?
Who benefits? And who does not?” Capers, supra note 1, at 1608.
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At first blush, the question of who is a victim may seem easy. But, I’m not
so sure that it is.25 There might be straightforward examples: if Dylan kills Vic
or steals Vic’s car, Vic certainly would be the victim. But does that mean that
Vic is the only victim? If Vic is dead (as in the homicide example), are Vic’s
friends or family members also victims? If so, how should society go about
limiting the class of victims? What about a relative who doesn’t see Vic often,
but who is devastated by the news? What about neighbors who didn’t know Vic
well but whose sense of safety is shattered by the crime? Such questions recur
even if Vic is alive—others could experience secondary trauma or suffer harms
as a result of criminal conduct that also victimized Vic. Even if Vic comes from
one of the communities that Capers is particularly concerned about, other
members of this broader class of victims might not (e.g., Vic’s car insurance
company, a wealthy neighbor or landlord, etc.).
Some of these questions may sound familiar—they arise in tort law and the
fraught case law on standing in private rights of action.26 Judges, lawmakers, and
commentators frequently struggle to define the class of injured parties entitled to
bring a civil suit.27 Such inquiries lead to a host of (largely unsatisfactory) linedrawing exercises: how proximate was the party? How were they affected by the
unlawful conduct? Did they suffer enough harm?
That question of harm is particularly significant to defining who is a victim.
Many criminal law theorists have argued that the state should only punish
conduct that harms others.28 This approach—the “harm principle”—offers an
ostensible bright line between damaging conduct that is the proper province of
criminal law and so-called victimless crimes.29 The principle is intuitively
appealing, and the bright line offers clarity. The problem, though, is that there is
no such bright line and therefore no such clarity.30

25. Cf. Anna Roberts, Victims, Right?, 42 C ARDOZO L. R EV. 1449, 1453 (2021) (arguing that
“victim” as a label and victimhood as a concept are more complicated than they initially appear).
26. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51
V AND. L. R EV. 1, 4 (1998) (“A plaintiff cannot win unless the defendant’s conduct was a wrong
relative to her, i.e., unless her right was violated. I shall call this principle the ‘substantive standing’ rule
and shall show that it is a fundamental feature of tort law.”); William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private
Attorney General” Is—and Why It Matters, 57 V AND. L. R EV. 2129, 2157 (2004).
27. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts As Wrongs, 88 T EX. L. R EV. 917, 958 (2010); Benjamin Ewing &
Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 Y ALE L.J.
350, 388 (2011) (collecting sources).
28. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. C RIM . L. &
C RIMINOLOGY 109, 114 (1999) (collecting sources).
29. See, e.g., JOEL F EINBERG, T HE MORAL L IMITS OF THE C RIMINAL L AW: H ARM TO
O THERS 10, 14, 26 187 (1984); H.L.A. H ART, L AW, L IBERTY, AND MORALITY 60–61, 75–77
(1963) Harcourt, supra note 28, at 129–34 (collecting sources).
30. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Prevention, Wrongdoing, and the Harm Principle’s Breaking
Point, 10 O HIO S T. J. C RIM . L. 685, 691 (2013).
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Bernard Harcourt has argued compellingly that the harm principle
“collapses” if we adopt a more capacious understanding of harm.31 That is, if
harm isn’t only experienced by an individual who suffers violence, but also by a
community or society at large, how do we figure out what constitutes harmless
conduct?32 Viewed in this light, harm functionally becomes an indeterminate
concept because so much conduct could lead to eventual harm, even if the
relationship isn’t immediately apparent.33 For example, many civil libertarians
would identify possession of (consensual adult) pornography as the sort of
conduct that shouldn’t be criminalized under the harm principle. But, many
radical feminists and pornography critics argue that pornography possession
does harm, either by fostering an abusive production market, or by entrenching
violent or dangerous views about sex.34 The point isn’t who’s right in their
assessment; it’s that there isn’t a clear line between harmful and harmless
conduct.
Capers cites to Harcourt and, indeed, critiques the way that expansive
understandings of harm have led to the criminalization and prosecution of
conduct that has no real victims.35 I agree with Capers. But I also think this same
critique applies just as forcefully to the concept of victimless crimes. That is, the
sort of capacious understanding of harm that Harcourt describes might also lead
to a capacious understanding of victimhood. To use the pornography example, if
the possession of pornography is harmful, then that might mean that there is a
large, and difficult-to-define class of victims. Capers certainly might counter that
this conception of victimhood is flawed or over-broad and that these aren’t the
victims he’s talking about.36 But, in a model of private prosecution, the definition
of victimhood becomes critically important. Rather than shifting power to
victims (at least directly), this model also might shift power to the institutions
and actors who define victimhood.37 And such definitions might depend heavily
on the values, assumptions, and ideology of the definers. So, a turn to “victims”
might simply empower judges, lawyers, legislators, and interest groups who will
undertake the project of defining who is a victim and who has the power to
prosecute.

31. See generally Harcourt, supra note 28.
32. See id. at 182.
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., C ATHARINE A. MAC K INNON, O NLY WORDS 4 (1993); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 H ARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R EV. 1 (1985).
35. See Capers, supra note 1, at 1593.
36. Cf. Dubber, supra note 23, at 191 (noting that “[t]he victims’ rights movement had no use
for derivative victims . . . “).
37. Cf. Levin, Criminal Justice Expertise, supra note 19, at 2829 (“[R]ather than shifting
authority or power to the experiential expert, there’s a risk that power (at least some amount of it) will
continue to rest with the arbiter of expertise.”).
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C. Individualizing Harm and Responsibility
For private prosecution to make sense, we would need to accept an
individualized theory of crime. That is, harm would need to be understood as the
product on an individual defendant (or specific group of defendants). And, harm
would need to be understood as something experienced by an individual or
discreet group of individuals—i.e., the victims.
Of course, some aspect of this dynamic is a feature of contemporary public
prosecution—instead of focusing on broader social dynamics, criminal
prosecutions identify individual defendants.38 But private prosecution goes even
further. Public prosecution relies on an underlying claim that crimes are a public
wrong—that we as members of society are all victims; as is the state.39 That’s
why the state has the authority to prosecute and punish. Private prosecution, then,
does away with such collective understanding and reinforces an understanding
of crime as involving individual actors and individual harm.
Capers—quite rightly, in my opinion—critiques the logic of crimes against
the state or crimes against society.40 He argues that seeing law breaking as doing
harm to the social order allows for almost limitless criminalization.41 I agree with
him that this understanding of criminal law has helped spawn an enormous
number of criminal offenses and an over-reliance on “governing through
crime.”42 If the way that society defends itself or deals with risk is to criminalize
conduct (including conduct that presents risk but does no harm), then the oneway ratchet of more criminal statutes, more prosecutions, and more punishment
seems almost inevitable.
But just because that public understanding of crime is objectionable doesn’t
mean that a private one is better.43 Indeed, as Capers notes, much critique of U.S.
38. See, e.g., Nicola Lacey, Differentiating Among Penal States, 61 B RIT. J. S OC . 778, 779
(2010) (“The ‘neoliberal’ impetus to economic deregulation, welfare state retraction, and
individualization of responsibility . . . has, paradoxically, gone hand in hand with the burgeoning of state
powers, state pro-activity, and state spending in the costly and intrusive business of punishment.”).
39. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 1, at 1582–84; C HRISTOPHER L. T OMLINS , LAW, L ABOR,
AND I DEOLOGY IN THE E ARLY A MERICAN R EPUBLIC 149 (1993) (describing the characterizations
of labor organizing as a crime against society); Benjamin Levin, American Gangsters: RICO, Criminal
Syndicates, and Conspiracy Law As Market Control, 48 H ARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R EV. 105, 110 (2013).
40. See Capers, supra note 1, at 1585.
41. See id.
42. See generally JONATHAN S IMON, GOVERNING T HROUGH C RIME : H OW THE W AR ON
C RIME T RANSFORMED A MERICAN D EMOCRACY AND C REATED A C ULTURE OF F EAR (2007).
43. It also might be worth asking whether—or to what extent—that private understanding of
crime already has gained ground due to the victims’ rights movement. See Aya Gruber, Righting Victim
Wrongs: Responding to Philosophical Criticisms of the Nonspecific Victim Liability Defense, 52 B UFF .
L. R EV. 433, 436 (2004) (“Like the tough-on-crime movement, the victims’ rights movement has grown
into a major socio-political force in the criminal system. Victims have been put in the forefront,
propelling the once-exclusively public area of criminal law inexorably toward privatization.” (footnotes
omitted)); Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for A General Criminal Defense Based on Wrongful
Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims’ Rights, 76 T EMP . L. R EV. 645, 653 (2003) (“The victim, in
modern criminal law, has emerged as an undeniable presence in all stages of a criminal case, shifting
the criminal paradigm away from simple government enforcement to increased privatization.”).
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criminal law focuses on its failure to recognize that interpersonal harm often
results from broader social or state failures.44 That’s one reason why some
commentators have linked mass incarceration to the rise of neoliberalism—
rather than providing social services or addressing the social conditions that
might lead to law breaking, the state focuses on individual bad actors and
individual bad conduct as exceptional.45
To be clear, Capers is critical of a punitive system that ignores context and
the need for services instead of (or in addition to) punishment.46 Yet in Against
Prosecutors, he argues that victims might help improve things. 47 If the state were
to provide victims with a menu of options beyond punishment or prosecution,
we might see a shift away from mass incarceration.48 That’s an empirical
question. And Capers might be right. But, retaining the option to punish harshly
strikes me as dangerous—it makes decarceration a potential benefit of individual
lenience, rather than a structural objective.49 Further, even if some victims
behaved the way that Capers hopes, this model of addressing social problems
still relies on individuals making good decisions and—as a result—strikes me as
both too uncertain to rely on and ill-suited to accomplish sweeping structural
change.
D. Trading “Public Law” Pathologies for “Private Law” Pathologies
Putting each of these critiques together, I worry that Capers is trading the
pathologies of “public law” for the pathologies of “private law.” To be clear, I
would push back on the idea that we could distinguish public law from private
law. But, it’s a common distinction in the legal academy.50 So, I think it might
be helpful as a frame to understand the challenge of Capers’s proposal.
44. See Capers, supra note 1, at 1601–02 (arguing for the need to “begin a conversation about
the state’s role in creating the conditions of crime”).
45. See, e.g., B ERNARD E. H ARCOURT , T HE ILLUSION OF F REE MARKETS : P UNISHMENT
AND THE MYTH OF N ATURAL O RDER 203 (2011); D AVID H ARVEY , A B RIEF H ISTORY OF
N EOLIBERALISM 2 (2005); E LIZABETH H INTON, F ROM THE W AR ON P OVERTY TO THE WAR
ON C RIME : T HE M AKING OF M ASS INCARCERATION IN A MERICA 1–2 (2016); L OÏC
WACQUANT , P UNISHING THE P OOR : T HE N EOLIBERAL G OVERNMENT OF S OCIAL INSECURITY
41 (2009); Katherine Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social Marginality, 3 P UNISHMENT &
S OC ’ Y 43, 55 (2001); Ruth Wilson Gilmore & Craig Gilmore, Restating the Obvious, in
INDEFENSIBLE S PACE : T HE A RCHITECTURE OF THE N ATIONAL INSECURITY S TATE 141, 150
(Michael Sorkin, ed. 2008).
46. See Capers, supra note 1, at 1598–1600.
47. See id.
48. See id. Capers’s observation about the role of constrained choice strikes me as important.
And, his argument is consistent with other scholars’ claims that people’s support for punitive policies
often reflects constrained choice, rather than preference in the abstract. See generally L ISA L. MILLER ,
T HE MYTH OF MOB R ULE : V IOLENT C RIME AND D EMOCRATIC P OLITICS (2016); JAMES
F ORMAN, JR ., L OCKING U P O UR O WN: C RIME AND P UNISHMENT IN B LACK A MERICA (2017).
49. See infra Part II.
50. For critical takes on this distinction and its role in legal thought, see, e.g., R OBERTO
MANGABEIRA U NGER , L AW IN MODERN S OCIETY 192–93 (1976); Karl E. Klare, The
Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. P A. L. R EV. 1358, 1415 (1982) (“[N]o private
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Criminal law that relies on public prosecution stands as the quintessential
form of “public” law. The state, not a private party, initiates the action and does
so in the name of the people, the community, or even the nation.51 Throughout
Against Prosecutors, Capers compellingly critiques this dynamic. And the
concerns that he raises are recurring worries with any public law institution:
perhaps most notably that criminal legal institutions come to reflect the will of
the powerful at the expense of the powerless (despite the illusion of democratic
accountability). Prosecutors, like lawmakers and judges, have their own
priorities, politics, and agendas, so “public” law ultimately rests on an
aggregation of private decisions, views, and actions.52 By ignoring private
interests or pretending that state action reflects the democratic will of “the
people,” we miss that public decisions have winners and losers (and that the
identity of those winners and losers may reflect specific ideological projects). 53
I am on board with that critical view as a general matter. And, I am very much
on board with Capers as he presents it in the prosecutorial realm.54
I worry, though, that Capers undersells the problems with private law. The
use of private suits to produce broader structural change has been met with
limited success elsewhere—from tort suits, to civil rights claims, or qui tam
actions.55 Just as public law is private, so too is private law public.56 That is, any
private suit implicates the state as enforcer, but also helps to shape the broader
social ordering.57 Unfortunately, using individual cases to achieve a broader
public purpose often has significant limitations. Each of the concerns raised in
this part—the limits of power shifting, the challenge in defining a class of
victims, and the problem of treating collective issues as individual ones—are all
ordering system is autonomous, or, to put it another way, . . . the notion of a public/private distinction is
incoherent.”); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reforms,
96 H ARV. L. R EV. 1497, 1499–501 (1983).
51. See, e.g., P AUL B UTLER , L ET’S GET F REE : A H IP -H OP T HEORY OF JUSTICE 115
(2009); Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 C OLUM . L. R EV.
249, 250 (2019).
52. See, e.g., MORTON J. H ORWITZ , T HE T RANSFORMATION OF A MERICAN L AW 17801860, 51–52, 63–66 (1977); Levin, American Gangsters, supra note 39, at 118.
53. Further, such a characterization of public law understates the individuals whose labor
constructs and defines public institutions. See Zohra Ahmed, Bargaining for Abolition, 90 F ORDHAM
L. R EV. 1953, 1955 (2022).
54. Valuable new research on prosecutorial elections helps to shine a light on these dynamics
and what interests are at play when a district attorney is elected. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick &
Nathan Pinnell, Special Interests in Prosecutor Elections, 19 O HIO S T. J. C RIM . L. 39 (2021) Ronald
F. Wright, Jeffrey L. Yates, & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Electoral Change and Progressive Prosecutors,
19 O HIO S T. J. C RIM . L. 125 (2021).
55. See, e.g., Alexander Reinert, Joanna C. Schwartz, James E. Pfander, New Federalism and
Civil Rights Enforcement, 116 N W. U. L. R EV. 737, 740 (2021); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Disingenuous
Demise and Death of Bivens, C ATO S UP . C T. R EV., 2019-2020, at 263, 285.
56. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 C ORNELL L.Q. 8, 19 (1927);
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 P OL. S CI. Q. 470,
471–72 (1923); Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 L EGAL S TUD. F. 327,
329–30 (1991).
57. See sources cited supra note 56.
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weaknesses of any private solution to a public problem. And, the rise of qualified
immunity, the death of Bivens, the aggressive manipulation of standing doctrine,
and the heavy regulation of both class actions and tort suits suggests that a
progressive approach to private law has run up against a brick wall. Relying on
private approaches to criminal law means placing faith in the same actors and
institutions (judges, legislators, etc.) who have shown hostility to progressive
approaches to tort and civil rights law.58
II.
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS FOR THE LEFT?
Stepping back from the practicalities of victim-driven prosecution, I see it
as worth considering Against Prosecutors’ place in the contemporary discourse
about criminal justice reform, transformation, or abolition. Against Prosecutors
highlights a critical division in contemporary debates about criminal policy: are
institutions of policing and punishment objectionable because they don’t work,
or are they objectionable because institutions of policing and punishment are
fundamentally objectionable? I read Capers’s article as reflecting the first
impulse.
Increasingly, commentators argue that the criminal system doesn’t work.59
Of course, such arguments implicitly presume a shared agreement on the purpose
of criminal law (one that I believe is sorely lacking).60 But, the argument
generally reflects a view that the contemporary institutions of policing and
punishment don’t make society safer and don’t actually serve the interest of
victims.
Notably, this line of argument has adherents with otherwise divergent
views and commitments. Reformers think that the system doesn’t work correctly,
so it must be reformed. For example, commentators across the political spectrum
who argue for “data driven” or “rational” approaches to public safety generally
contend that the institutions that we have are irrational.61 Sentences are
dramatically longer than necessary to respond to risk. Criminal laws and
punishments often reflect moral panic, anger, or revulsion, as opposed to wellreasoned judgements about what will reduce harm and suffering. And, the
58. Cf. Benjamin Levin, Values and Assumptions in Criminal Adjudication, 129 H ARV. L.
R EV. F. 379, 385–87 (2016) (arguing that proposals that rely on judges must reckon with judges’
troubling track records on racial justice).
59. See Douglas Husak, The Price of Criminal Law Skepticism: Ten Functions of the Criminal
Law, 23 N EW C RIM . L. R EV. 27, 35 (2020).
60. See Benjamin Levin, De-Democratizing Criminal Law, 39 C RIM . JUST. E THICS 74, 81
(2020) (reviewing RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS
INCARCERATION (2019)).
61. See, e.g., R ACHEL E LISE B ARKOW, P RISONERS OF P OLITICS : BREAKING THE C YCLE
OF MASS INCARCERATION (2019); D ARRYL K. B ROWN , F REE MARKET C RIMINAL JUSTICE :
H OW D EMOCRACY AND L AISSEZ F AIRE U NDERMINE THE R ULE OF L AW (2016); Roger A.
Fairfax, Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”: American Criminal Justice Reform—
Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. E CON. & P OL’ Y 597, 616 (2011).
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extreme financial costs of policing, prosecuting, and punishing don’t justify the
benefits in terms of reduced harm.62
More radical activists, academics, and commentators frame these claims
differently, but similarly argue that the system doesn’t keep us safer.63 (Yet they
often claim that the system “works” because its very goal is entrenching
inequality, which it does well.)64 Reliance on police increases the likelihood of
harm, trauma, and violence, and it fails to provide communities with the social
services they need.65 Jails and prisons do violence to incarcerated people, shifting
the site of harm and risk, rather than reducing harm and risk.66 And, criminalizing
conduct doesn’t actually address the root causes of crime and social suffering—
widespread inequality and a meager social safety net.
In short, the discourse on crime and victimization has become more
complicated than it was decades ago. The traditional Victims’ Rights Movement
rose to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s on the strength of a similar narrative
that the system wasn’t working, and specifically wasn’t working for victims. 67
The narrative and the movement, though, generally reflected a singular vision of
what victims wanted and what it meant for a system to serve the interests of

62. See, e.g., John Conyers, Jr., The Incarceration Explosion, 31 Y ALE L. & P OL’ Y R EV. 377,
378 (2013) (“[A] criminal justice system based on mass incarceration, in which we lock up more and
more people, and particularly more people of color, with no crime reduction impact, and at a tremendous
financial cost to our federal and state budgets, accomplishes none of those goals.” (Emphasis omitted)).
63. See, e.g., Kelly Hayes & Mariame Kaba, The Sentencing of Larry Nassar Was Not
“Transformative Justice.” Here’s Why, T HE A PPEAL (Feb. 5, 2018), https://theappeal.org/
the-sentencing-of-larry-nassar-was-not-transformative-justice-here-s-why-a2ea323a6645/; Mariame
Kaba & Andrea J. Ritchie, Opinion, We Want More Justice for Breonna Taylor than the System that
Killed Her Can Deliver, E SSENCE (Dec. 6, 2020), https://www.essence.com/feature/breonna-taylorjustice-abolition/; Cynthia Godsoe, The Place of the Prosecutor in Abolitionist Praxis, 69 UCLA L. Rev.
164, 183 (2022) (arguing that “abolitionism was born, in many ways, out of the criminal legal system’s
failure to address the needs of survivors”).
64. See, e.g., MARIAME K ABA, WE D O T HIS ‘T IL WE F REE U S : A BOLITIONIST
O RGANIZING AND T RANSFORMING JUSTICE 13 (Tamara K. Nopper ed., 2021); Rachel Herzing,
Commentary, “Tweaking Armageddon”: The Potential and Limits of Conditions of Confinement
Campaigns, 41 S OC . JUST. 190, 193–94 (2015) (“Far from being broken . . . the prison-industrial
complex is actually efficient at fulfilling its designed objectives—to control, cage, and disappear specific
segments of the population.”); Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits
of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1426 (2016) (“The Court has sanctioned racially unjust
criminal justice practices, creating a system where racially unjust police conduct is both lawful and how
the system is supposed to work.”).
65. See Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 C ALIF . L. R EV.
1781, 1833 (2020) (“Police are unlikely to offer any real resources or opportunities for healing. They
are likely to make arrests and exercise additional violence in response to calls from Black and brown
people, arresting and escalating rather than deescalating the violence against both victims/survivors and
people who caused the harm.”).
66. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. R EV.
1156, 1180 (2015).
67. See generally Dubber, supra note 23; MARIE GOTTSCHALK, T HE P RISON AND THE
GALLOWS : T HE P OLITICS OF M ASS INCARCERATION IN A MERICA 80–96 (2006); A YA GRUBER ,
T HE F EMINIST WAR ON C RIME: T HE U NEXPECTED R OLE OF WOMEN’ S L IBERATION IN MASS
INCARCERATION H ARDCOVE r 87–91 (2020).
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victims.68 In the name of a unified set of victims’ interests, activists sought (and
successfully obtained) a host of policies that increased punishment and restricted
the rights of criminal defendants.69
Against Prosecutors operates as an illustration of a new moment in leftleaning victims’ rights. Many people of many different politics agree that the
system doesn’t help victims. But, rather than framing that observation as support
for more punitive policies, progressive and left commentators increasingly
suggest that advancing victims’ interests isn’t tantamount to embracing the lawand-order politics of yesterday.70 Reformers contend that taking victims’ rights
seriously might require providing social services or institutions that prevent
crime in the first place.71 And, abolitionist activists increasingly stress the
importance of victims and frame their arguments not only in terms of criminal
punishment’s inhumanity, but in terms of the criminal system’s failure to do
justice for victims.72
There’s power in this move. Critics of “tough-on-crime” politics were often
tarred as being hostile to victims or not taking, harm, violence, or crime
seriously.73 And, it would be both morally and politically wrong to discount harm
and the all-too-real experiences of harm. So, this prioritization of victims among
critics of the carceral state has an intuitive appeal. It suggests that many of us
pushing to scale back or do away with the carceral state are the real victims’
rights advocates.
At the same time, this move has its limitations. And Against Prosecutors
demonstrates why there should be cause for concern. If your view of what’s
wrong with the criminal system is its failure to advance victims’ interests or its
failure to empower subordinated groups, then perhaps the turn to private
prosecution might be appealing. From this perspective, the persistence of
incarceration or criminal punishment might be less objectionable (or perhaps
desirable) if those tools were deployed in service of marginalized victims’

68. See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 I OWA L. R EV. 741, 772 (2007) (“[T]he
victim must occupy a specific, predefined legal space, such that granting her ‘rights’ will necessarily
lead to more incarceration for the defendant.”).
69. See generally Dubber, supra note 23; Gottschalk, supra note 67, at 82–92; Gruber, Victim
Wrongs, supra note 43, at 736 (“In society, ‘victim-talk’ pits victim character against offender character,
nearly exclusively to the detriment of the defendant.”).
70. See, e.g., L EIGH GOODMARK , D ECRIMINALIZING D OMESTIC V IOLENCE : A
B ALANCED P OLICY A PPROACH TO INTIMATE P ARTNER V IOLENCE 5 (2018); Andrea James,
Ending the Incarceration of Women and Girls, 128 Y ALE L.J.F. 772, 787 (2019).
71. See, e.g., Farhang Heydari, The Private Role in Public Safety, 90 GEO. WASH. L. R EV.
696, 717 (2022); Barry Friedman, Disaggregating the Policing Function, 169 U. P A. L. R EV. 925, 980
(2021).
72. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text; see also Morgan, supra note 23, at 1212
(describing “the work that survivors of sexual violence and state violence have done to reject the carceral
state as the only mechanism for obtaining justice”).
73. See S USAN E STRICH, GETTING A WAY WITH M URDER : H OW P OLITICS IS
D ESTROYING THE C RIMINAL J USTICE S YSTEM 64–66 (1998).
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interests.74 For those of us who are concerned about institutions of punishment
and deploying institutional violence against people deemed guilty or dangerous,
though, Against Prosecutors is answering the wrong question. And the (re)turn
to victims’ rights more broadly should raise red flags.
In a sense, the question of victims’ roles brings us back to Simonson’s
concept of power shifting.75 If the problem with the criminal system is who holds
the reins of power, then there might be reason to celebrate (or, at least, cautiously
experiment with) institutional arrangements designed to empower marginalized
victims. Such changes might shift power. But, if the problem is punishment
itself, then a project like Capers’s isn’t necessarily responsive.76 As an empirical
matter, victim-driven prosecution might reduce the scope of state violence.77 Or
it might not.78 But, it’s important to recognize that shifting power and reducing
the carceral state are different objectives, even if at times they overlap or reflect
similar anti-subordination logics.79
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, much of what makes Against Prosecutors so important is that
it functions less as a proposal than a provocation—an invitation for readers to
think collectively about a set of hard questions. That’s one reason I’m so glad to
have the opportunity to respond to Against Prosecutors and to do so alongside
so many other thoughtful commentators. Even if many of us still agree that
private prosecution would be bad news, we now realize that we do so for
different reasons.80 And, to my mind, that means the article succeeded—it has
forced us to grapple with our own assumptions and opinions about prosecutors
and what’s wrong with them. Articulating the reasons for those disagreements
strikes me as critically important—it surfaces or brings to light positions and
priorities that affect the way that each of us sees the criminal system. Each of
these disagreements is a key component of the contemporary movements to
address the injustices of mass incarceration. Questioning the basic architecture

74. Cf. Kate Levine & Benjamin Levin, Redistributing Justice (manuscript on file with author)
(outlining and critiquing this position); Benjamin Levin, Carceral Progressivism and Animal Victims,
in C ARCERAL L OGICS : H UMAN INCARCERATION AND A NIMAL C ONFINEMENT 87, 87–99 (Lori
Gruen & Justin Marceau, eds.) (Cambridge University Press 2022) (same).
75. See supra notes 8–12, and accompanying text.
76. See Trevor George Gardner, By Any Means: A Philosophical Frame for Rulemaking Reform
in Criminal Law, 130 Y ALE L.J. F ORUM 798, 805 (2021).
77. See Capers, supra note 1, at 1598–99.
78. See Gardner, supra note 76, at 810–12; John Rappaport, Some Doubts About
“Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. C HI. L. R EV. 711, 808 (2020).
79. See Levin, Criminal Justice Expertise, supra note 19, at 2828; Gardner, supra note 76, at
805; Simonson, supra note 8, at 789–90.
80. Cf. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., For Grand Juries, 13 C ALIF . L. R EV. O NLINE 20, 29 (2022)
(“Even those who would not subscribe to Capers’s proposal are now forced to explain why the current
system of public prosecution is superior to his vision—and what would make it better.”).
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of U.S. criminal legal institutions strikes me as a valuable project. So, I am
grateful for Against Prosecutors as a vehicle for initiating such a re-examination.
Personally, I share Capers’s criticisms of criminal legal institutions’ role in
entrenching inequality and marginalizing the already marginalized. But, my
first-order concern is state violence and the use of institutional power to control,
exclude, and punish. So, I am less worried about who holds the prosecutorial
power than I am that the prosecutorial power persists and is strengthened. At the
end of the day, I don’t believe that a redistributive or power-shifting project that
retains criminal punishment as a desirable tool can ever achieve its ends. State
violence, whether mobilized in the name of reactionary, conservative, liberal,
progressive, or socialist goals, remains state violence.81 That means there always
will be outsiders who are subjected to that violence and insiders who do that
subjecting. Criminal punishment and institutions of social control always will
function to marginalize and create an ingroup and an outgroup. We can reorient
who the insiders and outsiders are or who can harness that violence, but as long
as the capacity to exercise that violence remains and is enhanced, I don’t believe
that a truly egalitarian project is possible.

81. Cf. D AVID G ARLAND, P UNISHMENT AND WELFARE : A H ISTORY OF P ENAL
S TRUGGLES vi (Quid Pro Books 2018) (1985) (“[E]conomic structures [don’t] . . . determine penal
outcomes but rather . . . penal outcomes are consciously negotiated within the limits that economic,
political, and ideological structures impose.”).

